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Abstract 
This paper is an attempt to show how logically acceptable (or rational) belief in 
Traditional Akan religion is. The attempt is necessitated by the tendency by some scholars 
to (mis) treat all religions in a generic sense; and the potential which Akan religion has to 
influence philosophical debates on the nature of God and the rationality of belief in God 
– generally, on the practice of religion. It executes this task by expounding some rational 
features of the religion and culture of the Akan people of Ghana. It examines, in particular, 
the concept of God in Akan religion. This paper is therefore a philosophical argument on 
the sacred and institutional representation of what humans have come to refer to as 
“religious.”  
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 By “Traditional Akan religion,” I mean the indigenous system of sacred beliefs, 
values, and practices of the Akan people of Ghana1. This is not to say, however, that the 
Akans are only found in Ghana. Traditional Akan religion has features that distinguish it 
from other African religions, and more so from non-African ones. This seems to 
underscore the point that religious practice varies across the cultures of the world, 
although all religions could share some common attributes. Yet, some philosophers and 
religionists, for instance, have not been measured in their presentation of the general 
features of religion. The danger in doing this is that such philosophers and religionists 
risk coming across as scholars who are either unaware of the nuances of religion or 
overlook them. While, for instance, Jarvie and Agassi (1977) and Horton (1960) 
                                                            
1. In this essay, I will refer to indigenous Akan religion as “Traditional Akan religion” – but not 
as “traditional Akan religion”. This is because starting it with a capital letter makes it fall in 
line with the way the names of the other religions mentioned in this essay are written. Wole 
Soyinka’s “The burden of memory, the muse of forgiveness” (2014) underscores the equality 
of all religions.  
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generalize their findings on Western culture to cover all religions, Abioje, an African 
religionist, generalizes his observations on Yoruba religious thought to constitute the 
position of Traditional African thought. By each of these generalizations, the rationality 
of Traditional Akan religion would be affected. For, the argument of Jarvie and Agassi 
and Horton ultimately points to the irrationality of all religions (of which the Traditional 
Akan religion is one); and that of Abioje exposes Akan religion, being an African religion, 
to the charge of irrationality as leveled by Jarvie and Agassi and Horton. But, a careful 
examination of contemporary literature, including those of the above mentioned scholars, 
reveals how shaky the arguments of the two generalizing parties are – especially, if the 
question of the possible irrationality of Akan religion is considered. I begin with the 
argument of the former. 
 Some Western philosophers, such as Jarvie and Agassi (1977, p. 174), purport to 
ascribe “partial” rationality to all religions, while another Western philosopher, Horton 
(1960, p. 222) strips them off all rationality altogether. Jarvie and Agassi explain their 
position this way: 
 
… let us attribute rationality to an action if there is a goal to which it is 
directed; let us attribute rationality to a belief if it satisfies some 
standard or criterion of rationality which has been adopted, such as that 
it is based on good evidence, or is beyond reasonable doubt, or is held 
open to criticism, etc. (Jarvie & Agassi, 1977, p. 173) 
 
They therefore consider “the goal of religious actions as rational” because it includes 
“something like the worship of God, or the exorcism of sin, or the survival of life after 
death” (Jarvie & Agassi, 1977, p. 174). Nevertheless, they “maintain that religion defies 
most criteria of rational belief” and as such religious beliefs are irrational (Jarvie & 
Agassi, 1977, p. 174).  
 However, since religious actions, including those of the Akans, can hardly be 
devoid of any religious beliefs at all, it is difficult to see how Jarvie and Agassi’s apparent 
awarding of rationality to actions can absolve religion of the charge of irrationality. For 
religious beliefs are conceived by them as some sort of dogmas. Indeed, the other-worldly 
expectations of practitioners of Christianity, as well as the supernatural, superhuman 
origins of Christian tenets, have all contributed to the emergence of the idea of the alleged 
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These aspects of religion are not only taken as instances of unquestioning acceptance of 
beliefs among religious followers, but are also regarded as containing beliefs that are not 
beyond reasonable doubt. Religion is also seen, as in the thesis of Horton (1960, p. 222), 
to thrive on faith because human reason cannot justify it.  
 The above conceptions of religion, assuming they were right, would not really 
apply to Traditional Akan religion. While recognizing the fact that Akan religion 
postulates the existence of spiritual entities, it differs substantially from Christianity. In 
Akan culture, for instance, the source of religion is traced to the human being. He was not 
asked by any metaphysical, higher being to worship or practise religion. Regarding how 
Akans came to practise their religion and why they expect others to see the need to do 
same, Gyekye (1996, p. 5) observes that, according to the traditional Akan thinkers,   
 
the human being, irrespective of the culture to which he or she belongs, 
is essentially a religious being who will, sooner or later, come to see 
himself or herself as a created being and to appreciate the need not only 
to look for his or her creator but also to depend on the omnipotence and 
bounty of that creator…When man sees himself as a created being, he 
infers that there must be a creator worthy of worship and adoration. 
Traditional African religion is, thus, a natural religion, independent of 
revelation. 
 
 There are many logical conclusions that can be drawn from this perspective on 
the origin of religious beliefs or ideas. It can be said that traditional Akan sages have a 
clear view of the world, a world in which the human being only occupies a part, for, the 
need to depend on the omnipotence and bounty of the creator, and the idea of being a 
created being would not have come to him if he was not convinced in any way that he 
only has control, power, knowledge, and ability over some things and events, while he 
has virtually no control over other events or existents that lay beyond – the capabilities 
and knowledge of – humans.  In addition to this, it is evident that traditional Akan thinkers 
adopted what in Western thought, is referred to as Creationism – the belief that the world 
and things in it were substantially created as they are by a Supreme Being – to postulate 
the existence of a worshippable Supreme Being.2 So, if all this logical reasoning went 
into the discovery of religious beliefs by these thinkers, then, it may not be correct to 
                                                            
2 The reasons offered in this paragraph are more comprehensive and, thus, better account for 
worshippability of the Akan God than the account that will be given by Danquah in the next 
section. 
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make the categorical statement that religion is illogical. Indeed, the Akan thinkers will 
take exception to Benjamin Franklin's (Jarvie & Agassi, 1977, p. 175) rejection of religion 
because it is, to him (Franklin), irrational, in the same way as he (the Akan thinker) will 
contest Horton’s comment that religion is founded on faith and not on reason. For, he 
(Horton) suggests, reason supports science, the claims of which are observable or 
“testable” (1960, p. 222). Similarly, the Akan attitude toward religion contrasts with the 
Western orientation revealed by Jarvie and Agassi that “in our society it is no longer 
controversial to regard religion as irrational; indeed, few people these days bother to claim 
that religion is rational…” (Jarvie & Agassi, 1977, p. 174).  
 The main problem with Pius Abioje’s argument is that it erroneously draws Akan 
religion into the realm of “revelation” and possible irrationality – irrationality as 
conceived by the former group. Abioje is not the first person to argue that, generally, 
Traditional African religion is revealed; but he is most probably the first to offer the sort 
of reasons (to be explained below) in support of that argument. He is therefore singled 
out for discussion in this paper because (i) analyzing these (new) reasons for the revealed 
argument is crucial for the understanding of Traditional African religion(s), (ii) doing (i) 
above will show how generalizing about African religions does not always work, and (iii) 
his arguments have some implications for the rationality of Traditional African 
religion(s), including the Akan which is also the subject of this paper.  Abioje discusses 
the general features, common characteristics, of African religions – as a result of which 
he speaks of the religions in a singular sense. Consequently, I will adopt this singular 
sense in my discussion or critique of his views. 
 Although current discourses on Traditional African religion appear to have 
abandoned the discussions on whether or not the subject of their study is revealed, some 
contemporary scholars have seen the need to revisit the debate (on the origin of 
Traditional African religion) with the view to either introducing fresh perspectives to the 
issue or correcting past ideas. As recently as 2007, Pius Abioje made such an attempt with 
his publication in the Legon Journal of the Humanities. Therefore, a critique of his views, 
in the context of examining current opinions on Traditional African religion, is 
tantamount to addressing a contemporary problem regarding African thought.  
 Abioje attempts to compare aspects of Traditional African, Islamic, and Christian 
teachings, and makes recommendations that should lead to mutual respect between these 
religions. He also argues for the existence of shared human values, stressing that “Human 
beings can always learn from one another, generally speaking, if there is humility and 
openness of mind” (Abioje, 2007, p. 156). However, there are serious factual and logical 
problems regarding the generalization which he makes of his findings on Traditional 
Yoruba religion to cover Africa. Of interest to this paper are those that portray all African 
religions as revealed, especially after observing above that such a portrayal, if accurate, 
would make an African religion like the Akan to be regarded by some philosophers as 
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irrational. Here are a few examples. He argues that Traditional African religion is revealed 
because of a number of reasons. He suggests, first, that since a myth can be understood 
as “a sacred tradition or primordial revelation [that has] …some lessons to teach, beyond 
the material detail,” Traditional African religion must be a revealed religion because there 
are myths – some of which relate to God –  in traditional African thought (Abioje, 2007, 
p. 150). 
 It is not clear why Abioje should find this sense of revelation a good basis to 
suggest the revelation of Traditional African religion, especially, given the fact that he 
also shares S. O. Oso’s view that African myths are “the mental efforts of African 
ancestors to interpret the various cosmological and biological phenomena that they 
experienced” (Oso, 1979, p. 22).  In the instance where an experience-based religious 
truth or knowledge is described by religionists as having been “revealed naturally”, the 
suggestion has been that such a truth was acquired through the observation of nature. 
They sometimes call this “general revelation”. But, even in this context, the description 
of the experience as “revealed” could be quite misleading. For, the truth did not “impose” 
itself as such on the person. Rather, the world (the given world) was made sense of by the 
person, and subsequently thought of by him/her as leading to some religious truth. After 
all, subjects or individuals could come to different conclusions upon observing what is 
largely the same thing. It can, therefore, be maintained that the natural world does not 
necessarily “reveal” religious truths, since (for instance) it does not necessarily lead one 
to either the belief in the existence of God or to the practice of religion. One only comes 
to postulate nature-related religious truths on the basis of one’s own reflections, but not 
because there is a raw “revealed” world. This is consistent with Oso’s remark which 
effectively makes “revelation” alien to African thought. Natural religion is a creation of 
the human being that derives from the secondary activity of reflection – reflection on the 
natural world. This point, however, contrasts with what is often called “special 
revelation”, according to which God reveals His religion and prophesies to some special 
or chosen individuals. It is in this latter sense that religion can properly be described as 
“revealed”, a description which has made some to criticize religion as irrational. The term 
“revealed religion”, as just argued, does not make much sense in the context of “natural 
religion” because nature does not contain religion, let alone reveal it to humans. Humans 
rather construct natural religion. 
 What is needed by Abioje, therefore, to establish that Traditional African religion 
is a revealed one – something he unsuccessfully attempts to do – is any strong evidence 
that would suggest that God revealed His religion to our forebears. If African myths 
(which are not always religious) teach lessons, then they are the direct result of the good 
quality of reflection done by our forebears on certain recondite concepts. For sure, myths 
disclose the thoughts of their holders but do not necessarily show that those holders are 
“spoken to” or revealed to by a Deity in the sense in which religion is often criticized. 
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Therefore, to attribute “revelation” to Traditional African religion smacks of an attempt 
to superimpose an alien concept on African thought.  
 Abioje’s conviction that Traditional African religion is revealed can also be seen 
in his suggestion that adherents of that religion live by the revealed wishes of God. In this 
respect, he paraphrases E. B. Idowu (1977) and S. O. Oso (1979) as follows: “in man’s 
earthly life, he is in the hand of the Deity, and to live a good real life, the behests of the 
Deity must be fulfilled” (Abioje, 2007, p. 149). Of course, God is regarded in traditional 
thought as good. However, it is quite consistent and even more plausible to argue of the 
originators of this religion as having not received a sort of catalogue of dos and don’ts 
from God, but rather that they might have expected the good God, conceived as interested 
in the well-being of His creatures, to also prefer good human actions, especially those that 
enhanced the welfare of humans. This exposition also means that the adherents of 
Traditional African religion did, as they still do, determine good human actions without 
having to receive any revelation; and that, they have always cherished actions or lifestyles 
founded on sound moral principles, not because those actions or lifestyles are the 
commandments of God. Consequently, life on earth, to the practitioners, cannot be 
fulfilling because it is at the behest of God, but because the actions are motivated by 
goodness. It may well be that the problems with Abioje’s thesis have to do with the way 
he interpreted his sources and, indeed, the generalization of his findings on Yoruba 
religion as wholly applicable to Traditional African religion. 
 This paper will, henceforth, discuss the Akan concept of God, and then the 
rationality of Akan religion as contained in some wise Akan sayings. The choice of wise 
sayings is dictated by the need to tap directly into traditional philosophy which is 
sometimes found in maxims.  
 
The Concept of God in Traditional Akan Thought 
 Here, I intend to analyze Akan expressions for God, and discuss the rationality 
of arguing that His goodness should lead to His being “worshipped.” I will also look at 
whether or not He is personal. All this is to help clarify the Akan concept of God. 
 In the Akan language, God is referred to as Onyankopↄn (Nyankopↄn) or Onyame 
(Nyame). Beside these, He has several appellations that seek to convey traditional ideas 
about His nature, works and potency. An example is Ↄbↄadeε (Creator, Creator of all 
things) which also contains the notion of a potent God – since He must logically be potent 
(indeed, omnipotent) to be able to create all things. Onyankopↄn and Onyame are often 
used interchangeably, although some Akan thinkers have sought to distinguish between 
them. Danquah, for example, has suggested that in a primal sense of God (as “Great 
Ancestor” of humans), God is referred to as Onyame (Danquah, 1968, p. 27 and p. 152). 
But the concept of Onyankopↄn (the “Nana of Ultimate Reality”), in his view, suggests 
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more greatness. He further posits that above Onyankopↄn, is the notion of Ↄdomankoma 
which expresses the idea of the Final God (Danquah, p. 152).  
 Danquah distinguishes between Onyame and Onyankopↄn in terms of 
constitution. The former, according to him, is “feeling” or a “feeling entity” with 
Onyankopↄn as its metaphysical or intellectual goal (1968, p. 141). Therefore, relating 
feeling (or Onyame) to sunsum and insight (or Onyankopↄn) to “okara”3 (understood as 
“destiny”), Danquah makes Onyankopↄn “the greater actualization, or deeper meaning or 
the intent of Onyame” since “Onyankopon (sic.) is the Okara of Onyame” (1968, p. 141). 
Although Onyankopↄn is placed higher by Danquah, He is not deemed to be entirely 
different from Onyame, in spite of his conviction that they are conceptually separable. 
The Akan, he explains, 
 
conceived Nyankopon as not being absolutely bereft of all the primitive 
nature that had attached to Onyame. Onyankopon, too, is feeling. But 
feeling of a certain active mind, what, at a higher remove, is called 
conation, or will; namely, an attitude of mind involving a tendency to 
take action. Again, the Akan conceived of Onyankopon as having the 
new and additional character of intuition or insight, the intellectual 
capacity that only an Okara other than Sunsum can possess (Danquah, 
p. 147). 
 
This seems to suggest that the insight and activity of God unite sunsum and ↄkra in 
the concept of Onyankopↄn. Secondly, it is apparent that Onyankopↄn should have a 
logical connection with the more abstract Ↄdomankoma. For although Ↄdomankoma in 
itself is Soul, an “Ideal” (Danquah, 1968, pp. 67-68) and devoid of experience, for Him 
to be an “experiencing being” and be known or experienced by humans (Danquah, pp. 
67-68), He must do so through Onyankopↄn who, according to Danquah, embodies both 
experience and Ideal (“sunsum” and “okara”) (pp. 68-69). The element of experience in 
Ↄdomankoma is, or is supplied by, Onyankopↄn. This, logically, seems to be his main 
reason for putting forward Onyankopↄn as a concept ultimately receptive of the other two: 
that “In the conception of Onyankopon as both Sunsum and Okara, the primal Onyame 
and the final Odomankoma have a reconciliation” (Danquah, p. 152). For Danquah, “this 
dual nature of Onyankopon comes to us under two modes: (1) the conception of him as 
                                                            
3 In Akan language, the soul is referred to as ↄkra. Danquah’s reference to it as “okara” appears to 
make possible a link between the ancient, black Egyptian ka (soul) and the Akan soul, since ka 
is contained in “o-ka-ra.” 
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the Okara of Onyame, and (2) the conception of him as the Sunsum of Odomankoma” (p. 
147). 
 From the above, I make just two observations. First, that perhaps, the centrality 
of the concept of Onyankopↄn in understanding the Akan doctrine of God – even in such 
a divisionist thesis as Danquah’s – explains why Onyankopↄn is an acceptable translation 
for the word “God.” Secondly, in Akan thought, the metaphysical ideas of the ↄkra (soul) 
and sunsum (spirit; or activity [according to Danquah]) together suggest fundamental 
existence. In this sense, the physical side of any being is distinguished from its core, 
metaphysical component. The latter is sometimes spoken of in separate ways (as in 
sunsum and ↄkra) or as one entity (as ↄkra which, in any case, is a spiritual entity – hence, 
a sunsum). The human example of this point is articulated by Gyekye (1995, p. 98). But 
this also means that sunsum is probably the most basic, essential element of all 
experiencing or existing beings. Accordingly, if Danquah identifies Onyame with 
sunsum, then it could imply that Onyankopↄn and Ↄdomankoma cannot be conceived 
without Onyame. Onyame, therefore, is the essential identity of God who, in a more 
comprehensive form, is Onyankopↄn. These two names, unlike, Ↄdomankoma, capture 
the heart of the ontology of God – for, they convey to us God’s basic identity as a 
metaphysical being who experiences and can be experienced. But if, as Danquah notes, 
the “deeper meaning” of Onyame is Onyankopↄn, then, it is not surprising that Akan 
thinkers use the two names interchangeably. In this paper, I adopt the same approach of 
using the two names interchangeably. 
 Onyankopↄn is seen in Akan thought as good and “identified with goodness 
itself” (Gyekye, 1996, p. 9). Hence, Onyankopↄn is not only a desirer of goodness, but 
also a doer of good. Danquah’s understanding of the word “good” appears to capture 
sufficiently the latter half of the preceding statement. For, his understanding of it is 
instrumental. That is to say, he advances that to be good is to do good. As he puts it, 
“Goodness implies value of something done”, and that “Onyankopon’s doing is good” 
(Danquah, 1968, p. 152). Therefore, if it is said that “Onyankopon is good” or is “the 
Supreme Good,” it means that He is “the Akan God of Beneficence, practical content of 
moral life” (Danquah, p. 152). This practical usefulness of Onyankopↄn seems to 
Danquah to call for some reciprocal action from the Akan. Indeed, in the immediate 
consequence to this presentation of the practical conception of the goodness of God, 
Danquah rhetorically asks: “Why should he (Onyankopon) not be worshipped?” 
(Danquah, pp. 152-153). 
 But the question that some philosophers would ask here is: “Why should 
Onyankopↄn be worshipped as a result of His supreme goodness to the human being? 
How much, if it does at all, should God’s being supremely good count in His being an 
object of worship? If these questions are understood in the manner discussed by Socrates 
in the Euthyphro, then, it could be said that being good to humans does not call for the 
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worshipping of the good-doer. Socrates pointed out how the gods’ goodness to humans 
in exchange for worship amounted to a form of barter – and thus not morally worthy. For 
a morally worthy action is the one performed in expectation of no goods. It appears, then, 
that the more intelligent and morally aware a being is, the more dishonorable it would be 
for that being to engage in this trade-off. God is conceived of in Akan thought as 
supremely moral and rational. As such, it would not be appropriate, on Socratic grounds, 
to ascribe worshippability to Him on the basis of His goodness or, worse still, supreme 
goodness to humans.  
 However, this unjustified correlation between goodness or supreme goodness and 
worship could mislead one into attributing worshippable status, even if at a lower level, 
to some non-human agents of goodness. Ancestors are an example. They are believed in 
Akan thought to be good to the living. It is held that they promote the well-being of the 
community by enforcing morality and, also, “helping” or “blessing” those who “obey the 
laws and customs and fulfil their obligations” (Busia, 1954, p. 201).  In doing this, the 
ancestors “see to it that the crops of such people are plentiful, that children are born to 
them and that their undertakings prosper” (Busia, p. 201). Yet, many Akan philosophers, 
including Gyekye (1996, p. 161), have argued that the ancestors are not worshipped. This 
implies that in a case where a worshipped being is deemed to be good, more is required 
than goodness or supreme goodness to justify the being’s worshippability. 
 It is appropriate here to emphasize the need to treat the question of the 
“worshipping” of God with caution, since, if not well explained, “worship” might not 
apply to Traditional Akan religion. Unlike, say, in Christianity where “worship” could 
mean a religious service to God, Onyankopↄn is not in this way worshipped. For, 
Onyankopↄn does not have any religious service that is performed in His honour. What 
comes close to being a religious service is the gathering of the people in celebration of 
religious festivals or landmarks. But even here, the gathering (usually, annually) is often 
in celebration of the benefits of those events to the people, and to acknowledge the role 
believed to have been played by the community’s deity (“lesser god”) and ancestors in 
their achievement. The deity is conceived of as an intermediary between Onyankopↄn and 
the people, but such gatherings as mentioned above are neither in the absolute “service” 
of the deity nor Onyankopↄn. 
 Nonetheless, if by “worship,” the intended objective is the showing of veneration 
or devotion to a supernatural being, then this applies to Onyankopↄn. From the foregoing, 
it would be wrong to describe practitioners of Traditional religion as “worshippers of 
deities (or lesser gods)”. By parity of reasoning, the reference to Traditional religion by 
many Akan speakers – having been most probably influenced by Christian teachings – as 
abosonsom (literally, “the-lesser-god or fetish religion”) does not appear to capture very 
well the Akan situation. Secondly, even though the word som is commonly translated as:  
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1. “to serve” – for instance, “the girl will serve this nation very well” is 
rendered in Akan as abaayewa no bεsom oman yi yie, 
2. “to worship” (as in attending religious service) – the statement 
“Christians meet on Sundays to worship God” is translated as Kristofoↄ 
hyia Kwasiadabiara som Nyame, 
3. “religion” – “Christian religion” is literally translated as Kristosom, 
 
translations 2 and 3 have to be carefully looked at. On the basis of the initial discussion 
of “worship” and the Akan culture, it can be inferred that translation 2 is not part of Akan 
sacred practices. Likewise, som as religion (translation 3) appears not to be a good 
translation of the English word ‘religion’ because som does not translate into other 
contextual understandings of the word. For instance, the idea of religion as an organized 
body with all its institutional structures, guiding scriptures and proselytizing tendencies 
is not quite applicable to the Akan cultural paradigm. As a result, som may not necessarily 
mean religion but represent ways in which Akan culture (and possibly different 
indigenous African cultures as well) tries to make sense of this Western culture called 
“religion.” An objection may be raised about why, given the preceding statement, the title 
of this paper has “Akan religion” in it at all. Indeed, the paper is about aspects of Akan 
sacred beliefs and practices; but it is for want of a better expression that the beliefs and 
practices are presented as components of “Akan religion.”  
 Onyankopↄn is also perceived in personal terms. The personality of Onyankopↄn 
is, for instance, implicit in the following appellations. Nana (Grand Ancestor), 
Abↄmmubuwafrε (Consoler), Ↄbↄadeε (Creator), Nyaamanekose (One in whom you 
confide when in trouble) [Opoku, 1978, p. 15]. In spite of all this, Onyankopↄn is regarded 
as a spirit. Religion is fundamental to the individual and the community, as God and other 
supernatural entities are believed to play important roles in the life of both the individual 
and the community. For instance, the powers of the deities (abosom) are sought for 
individual and communal protection, and libation is not even poured without the mention 
of God. But God, being personal, is portrayed in libation as one who understands prayers 
and grants the requests of humans. Moreover, the Akan would sometimes say Nana 
Nyame boa me! (“God help me!”) when in need or difficulty. A deity, on the other hand, 
might give a charm to a person to serve some need. Similar roles are attributed to the 
deities and God in most African cultures, although there may be significant differences 
between theirs and the Akan’s. 
 Consider Yoruba and Akan religions: Abioje holds the view that charms (or what 
he calls “occultic charms”) in Yoruba thought enjoy the blessing of God; and he 
eventually comes to the conclusion that “occultic charm incantations also reflect a mark 
of divine revelation” (2007, p. 152). With his view on charms – especially those meant 
for evil purposes – Abioje was seeking to use the Biblical Isaiah’s declaration (Isaiah 
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45:7) about God as having revealed His nature as the author of both good and evil to claim 
that what is contained in Isaiah’s message is neither new nor different from what 
adherents of Traditional Yoruba religion have always held about God. Abioje puts it more 
bluntly: “An informant put the argument to rest when he asked: ‘Who made snakes and 
scorpions?’ He said it was the same God who made sorcerers and witches” (2007, p. 152). 
 In Akan metaphysical thought, also, the deities who are the source of charms play 
very critical roles. Apart from their status, in Akan thought, as the next most potent beings 
after God, they are also regarded as intermediaries between humans and God. They are, 
like humans, creations of God and free. Their potency derives from God but they have 
autonomy and preferences (Gyekye, 1995, pp. 124-125). This is what makes it possible 
for them to use their powers in ways that do not promote the well-being of human beings, 
and in ways that God would not like. So, if someone consults a deity for a charm – or, if 
someone who has such a charm passes it on to another – with the intention of harming 
someone else and his wishes are fulfilled, the Akan would say to him that he has or his 
charms have the blessing of the originating deity. This is contrary to the Yoruba position 
that charms “enjoy the blessing of God”. And, if “occultic charm connotes power, and a 
misuse of it represents abuse of power” (Abioje, 2007, pp. 153-154), then the difference 
is this: while in Yoruba thought responsibility for the abuse may ultimately be traced to 
God, only the user-recipient of the charm and the deity would be the abusers of power in 
Akan thought. 
 Quite related to the foregoing is the reference to the deities as “agents of God”. 
Abioje asserts that “many adherents of the [Yoruba] religion maintain that all the 
divinities and spirits that are worshipped are agents of God” (Abioje, 2007, p. 150). This 
seems to imply that the divinities are representatives or that they act only at the bidding 
of God. In Akan thought, on the other hand, the divinities (abosom) are believed to (i) do 
things only occasionally on behalf of God, and (ii) do some things on behalf of human 
beings sometimes. If these make them agents, then they are agents of humans as well. 4 
Having discussed the concept of God in Akan thought – especially, the nature, 
worshippability, and personality of God – I now discuss the logical foundation of belief 





                                                            
4 I do not therefore support the prominent Akan philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu (1980) when he 
describes abosom as “agencies” of Onyankopon (God). See the chapter “Philosophy, Mysticism 
and Rationality.” 
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Rationality of Akan Religion: Evidence from Wise Sayings 
 
 The rationality of the Akan religion is, to some extent, inherent in some wise 
sayings of religious nature, especially those that seem to point to the rational origin of the 
Akan religion itself. But these sayings are unknown to many Western philosophers who 
continue not to see that some religions – in our case, Traditional Akan religion – could be 
rational.   
 It is well a discussed and established fact that Akan religion is natural. This being 
the case, it is also regarded as potentially comprehensible to every rational (human) being. 
This conception of the religion is also true of the Akan perspective on God. The maxim 
Obi nkyerε akwadaa Nyame (literally, “Nobody needs show God to a child” [Sarpong, 
1974, p. 9] or better still “Nobody teaches God to a child”) appears to indicate their belief 
that the child, being a rational being, will come to the realization of God as he or she 
matures and, thus, gains more awareness of himself or herself, the environment, and the 
nature of the world. Accordingly, without any special revelation from God as such, Akan 
thinkers were able to postulate that God must be spiritual and everywhere. Confirming 
this position is the saying that Wo pεsε woka asεm kyerε Nyame a, ka kyerε mframa 
(literally, “If you want to say something to God, say it to the wind”). The thinking behind 
this is that although God is not perceptible, He has metaphysical presence everywhere, 
just as the wind/air is everywhere.  
 Another reason why the rational basis for Akan religion seems plausible is that 
there is indeed a concept of rationality in Akan thought. A statement or argument is 
regarded as irrational if it contains contradictions. But if it is devoid of contradictions and 
is logically acceptable, it is said of it Ԑtↄ aso mu (literally, “It falls [well] into the ear”). 
But the capacity to determine which arguments or statements “fall well into the ear” is 
regarded as a human attribute, for, only humans are believed to have the capacity to think 
(dwen). This is the reason why the human capacity to self-know God and the nonexistence 
of missionary work are such important features of Akan religion. 
 Finally, the humanistic character of Akan religion provides for its rationality. The 
religion is humanistic because it thrives on interpersonal ethics (or relationships) and the 
exploitation of spiritual entities (or their powers) for human good on earth. The Akan 
thinker may then argue that if one seeks the promotion of human well-being, then, one 
should accept religion. This way, religion becomes rational to practice because it is 
contradictory to seek human well-being (on earth) and, at the same time, reject a 
humanistic religion. It would also be inappropriate to withhold or refuse to assist an 
afflicted person, especially if one is in a position to do otherwise. The refusal to help in 
such a situation would be deemed as inhuman, for it would be as if one was oblivious of 
the basic human condition, i.e.,   the human being requires and deserves to be helped. 
This human conceptual entitlement to help is expressed in the saying Onipa hia mmoa 
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(“the Human being needs help”). No individual is deemed to be self-sufficient. One is 
therefore encouraged to relate well to every human being with the love and kindness that 
one would offer to a brother or sister. This ultimately generates fellow-feeling – a notion 
which is captured in the saying Onipa nua ne ’nipa (meaning, “The sibling of a human 
being is a human being”). Thus, if by virtue of one’s humanness, one ought to be treated 
kindly or humanely, it would be quite unreasonable if one should disregard the 
predicament of others. Another issue is that this might generate a situation where one 
would also be neglected by some in one’s time of difficulty. [I do not imply that one ought 
to be neglected in such situations.]  
 However, if one wills or initiates evil against another, it is regarded in the Akan 
culture as both inhuman and self-destructive. It is also understood that one may act badly 
not necessarily by initiating evil action, but by refusing to stop an impending danger when 
one is in a position to do so (or has the duty to do so). This refusal to act is also seen as 
self-destructive. Indeed, this teaching is implicit in the maxim Ↄkomfobↄne se kuro mmↄ 
a, ↄtemu bi (“If a bad traditional priest wills that his town be ruined, he will live in it as 
well”). In other words, if the traditional priest who is supposed to intercede on behalf of 
the people refuses to do so, but rather vaticinates or invokes the powers of the deity for 
the destruction of the town, he cannot logically expect the town to be habitable for him 
as well.  
 The three maxims above together suggest that if one permits, wills, or initiates 
the destruction of another, one will eventually suffer some consequences too. This seems 
to underscore the reasonableness in seeing oneself in the Other and being supportive of 
one another for communal and personal good. In Akan culture, one is usually advised Wo 
yↄnko da ne woda (literally, “Where your fellow human being lies is where you also lie” 
or “The situation your fellow human being finds him/her self in is what you [could] also 
find yourself in”). It suggests that the well-being of the community or humanity is not 
sought through selfish actions but by seeking the progress and interests of all. This way 
of ensuring the well-being of the community is always done in tandem with familial and 
communal performance of rites aimed at soliciting the help of the ancestors and deities. 
Such rites are usually performed on specific days of the week, festive occasions, and at 
public events. On the basis of the foregoing, the Akan thinker would advance that religion 




 This paper has argued for the rationality of Traditional Akan religion, with special 
focus on the belief in God and on some Akan sayings. The idea of God and His role in 
the religious and communal life of the Akan have been shown to have developed on the 
basis of reflection – particularly, on the basis of some conceptions of rationality inherent 
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in the Akan culture. In connection with this, some wise Akan sayings were explained. 
Also, since the supernatural (in this case, God) is an important element of Traditional 
Akan religion, this paper essentially is a presentation of the rationality of the supernatural 
in Akan metaphysical thought.    
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